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"What crop," I would ask, "is the small man, who has but little or
no capital, to start farming with if it be not the mealie?" It
is, I maintain, the "poor man's friend," and remains the best and
surest crop for any small farmer in the Eastern Transvaal to take
up and begin his journey along the pathway to prosperity.
[Statement of Esrael Lazarus, wealthy owner of Bombardie and
Cologne Estates, Eastern Transvaal].
The conditions disclosed in this case are tantamount to slave
driving, the magistrate said. On a farm [near Bethal] of 400
morgen 25 native labourers were employed and they were driven to
do their work by means of the sjambok. It was akin to slavery to
drive the boys in this manner and practice of that type would not
be permitted.3
Listen District Commissioner, I am complaining that we are in
trouble here. We are being beaten very much. . . . Many people
die here and many disappear from the farm. My brother was killed
last week and I therefore have deserted. . . . People are as
slaves here at the farm J.J. Dorfan. Europeans and Boss boys
carry whips here for beating the people. It is said there is
nobody to whom we can complain. Even if we die it is nothing.4
Introduction
Bethal is a place with a reputation. The early Dutch-speaking
pioneers who first settled in the area were so gratified to find such a
lovely place that they bestowed it with a special name — one which
they borrowed from the Book of Genesis in the Old Testament and which
means "abode of God." They thought that this name would give the town
and the surrounding district a particular distinction as a holy place,
like the original spot where Jacob rested and dreamed that a ladder
stretched from earth to heaven, and he felt himself to be in the
presence of God.5 Yet the passage of time often has a way of
dispensing cruel ironies. The reputation which Bethal acquired has
little to do with the sacred ideals which its name evokes, and more to
do with profane realities of profit-making. With the growth and
development of commercial agriculture in the early twentieth century,
the Bethal district became one of the most productive farming regions
of the South African countryside. The wealthy farmers of the district
— with their huge estates and great success in growing staple crops
for distant markets — became the envy of the marginal * little men' who
struggled to stay afloat under crushing debt, high prices, and low
returns. These large-scale Bethal farmers were often portrayed in
ruling class circles as the standard bearers of economic advance in
agriculture.6 Yet this well-cultivated image of ^progressive' farming
contrasts sharply with the historical memory of those who borne the
brunt of decades of cost-cutting and profit-maximizing measures. In
their relentless pursuit of profit, the farmers of the district
subjected their African labourers to such harsh and abusive treatment
that it was not long before the name Bethal became synonymous with
callous brutality, ill-treatment, and violent death. In the minds of
Africans, working on the white-owned farms of the Bethal district was
akin to slavery and was to be avoided at all costs.
Yet how and why the Bethal district achieved such notoriety is a
story that cannot be easily recounted chronologically. Let us begin at
the end. Bethal is a small platteland town situated in the heartland
of the fertile farming zone of the eastern Transvaal highveld, about
halfway between Johannesburg and the Swaziland border. The town and
surrounding countryside do not carry any distinguishing marks that
would set them apart from any of the other small farming centers that
dot the eastern Transvaal countryside. The Bethal district has long
been recognized as "one of the best agricultural districts in the
Transvaal."7 It is situated on the eastern portion of a large region
commonly known as the *maize triangle', with its apices at Ladybrand in
the south, Ermelo in the north-east and Lichtenburg in the north-west.
Because of the productivity of the land and the type of use to which it
is put, the Bethal district has been classified as * intensive arable',
or an area suitable for staple crop production. By the 1940s, this
area accounted for around 60 percent of the total maize output in the
Union.8
What historically set the Bethal district apart from other farming
areas of the same type was its peculiar blend of highly favourable
ecological characteristics. The single most important climatic
determinant of crop yields is rainfall. Throughout South Africa, by
and large, the annual isohyet of 20 inches is generally considered the
standard by which to demarcate zonally the maize-producing from non-
producing areas. On the highveld plateau, the highest yields per
morgen have been historically found near the 30-inch isohyet, in the
Bethal-Standerton area, where the annual rainfall during the crucial
growing months of December, January, and February was more or less
evenly distributed. Only in the midlands of southern Natal, with
annual rainfalls of between 30 and 40 inches, have these yields
regularly exceeded. The loamy, doleritic soils of the highveld maize-
belt made the region exceptionally fertile and largely accounted for
the high productivity of the Bethal-Standerton-Ermelo area.9
These natural endowments laid the foundation upon which the
landowning classes reshaped the physical landscape in their headlong
drive to produce cash crops for market. In order to grasp why
farmworkers in the Bethal district "existed in a state of semi-slavery"
and were "exploited to the utmost by the majority of employers,"10 it
is necessary to provide both an understanding of the historical
processes of capitalist development in this particular region and a
contextualisation of that past within a broader comparative framework.
Speaking broadly, there were three striking characteristics that set
commercial agriculture in the Bethal district apart from the general
pattern of agrarian transformation in the eastern Transvaal highveld.
First, the leading capitalised farmers in the Bethal district organised
agricultural production on large-scale, landed estates and employed
semi-permanent workers on long-term contracts. By imposing a social
dimension — stretching out work over the course of the entire year —
upon the natural rhythms (i.e., seasonal cycles) of agricultural
production, these enterprising farmers were able to fashion what were,
in actuality, ^factories in the fields'. Unlike undercapitalised
farmers who struggled to *tame' labour-tenant households, the large-
scale farmers of the eastern Transvaal maize belt tried to make the
most use of their labour resources by hiring wage-labourers on a full-
time footing and putting them to work them in a highly disciplined and
productive fashion.11
Second, because of persistent labour shortages throughout the
eastern Transvaal highveld, large-scale farmers of the Bethal district
depended in large measure upon migrant workers recruited from far
afield to supplement the small labour force permanently settled on
their properties. Desperate farmers regularly appealed to the state
administration for assistance in recruiting labour from neighbouring
territories, particularly Southern Rhodesia, Portuguese East Africa,
and Nyasaland, in order to meet their labour requirements. But they
also took matters into their own hands, creating their own recruiting
agencies and sometimes relying upon illicit labour traffickers to
supply them with requisite labour. During the early years of expansive
growth, Bethal farmers illegally recruited umfaans. or child labour,
and, in later years, tapped into the prisons, in order to satisfy their
seemingly insatiable appetite for low-cost labour.12 Third, and
finally, the large-scale landowners in the Bethal area modelled their
farming operations after the Johannesburg mines. As a general rule,
they recruited young men in the prime of life who were housed in
barracks-like compounds which were guarded virtually around the clock.
They depended upon piece-work to speed-up and stretch-out the working-
day, and they introduced the * ticket-system' and as the principal means
of payment. They relied upon African intermediaries to oversee and
supervise their workers. In addition, they used harsh treatment,
including beatings and other forms of physical abuse, to instil fear
and ensure compliance.13
"An Epic of the Soil11: Esrael Lazarus, the "Mealie King11
By the early twentieth century, town and country in South Africa
came to depend intensely on each other, and it was commercial
agriculture that provided the principal lifeline connecting the
burgeoning urban markets with the points of production in the
surrounding rural areas.14 What the Bethal district shared with other
highveld farming areas was that agricultural-related pursuits largely
shaped its social and economic destiny. Fertile soil, consistent and
adequate rainfall, the long growing season, and relatively flat terrain
were the natural conditions which, combined with the close proximity to
the Rand and the gold mines, made Bethal an attractive area for
commercial farming. In the decade or so after the South African War
(1899-1902), when agricultural production in the highveld experienced a
decisive *take off under the protective shelter of the (Milner)
Reconstruction administration, a sizeable number of English-speaking
farmers, including a number of Lithuanian Jewish immigrants, acquired
farms in the southern Middelburg and Bethal districts. These English-
speakers thus joined an already established group of landowning Boer
notables whose families had expropriated land from the original African
inhabitants in the nineteenth century.15 The demand of the gold mining
industry for cheap foodstuffs created a ready market to which
enterprising farmers were quick to respond. The new arrivals
concentrated on maize production as their principal cash crop. By the
1920s, white farmers producing for both local and overseas markets had
transformed the entire region east of Johannesburg from Kinross in the
west, to Witbank and Middelburg in the north, Standerton in the south,
and including parts of the Ermelo and Carolina districts in the east,
into an intensive maize-growing belt.16
Esrael Lazarus epitomised the rise and expansion of capitalist
farming in the Bethal district. He had emigrated to Johannesburg from
Lithuania at the end of the nineteenth century, thus joining the steady
flow of European newcomers who streamed into the Transvaal in the wake
of the gigantic mineral discoveries on the Rand.17 Lazarus, who
arrived virtually penniless, initially found work as an assistant store
clerk, and within a few years, he opened his own small trading store.
With the onset of the agricultural depression of 19 07-1911, many
financially hardpressed farmers were forced off the land by high costs
and low profits. As a result, large numbers of farms changed hands.18
During this volatile period, Lazarus reached the conclusion "that maize
growing could be made more profitable than maize selling." Along with
a number of other Lithuanian immigrants who made substantial profits in
urban-based commerce, he pooled his accumulated savings and, along with
outside financial backing, he purchased prime farm land in eastern
Transvaal maize belt. At this time, access to credit was a crucial
factor determining the success of commercial farming. On the one side,
aspiring farmers who entered agriculture with capital were able to
obtain large and already improved farms, and, consequently, they were
able to use these newly-acquired properties as collateral in order to
secure much-needed credit- On the other side, those white landowners
with limited capital or little land found themselves trapped in a
desperate situation.19
By 1911, Lazarus had begun farming on a "prodigious scale." He
used profits from his expanding network of trading stores, along with
revenues derived from land sales and milling activities, to finance
more land purchases. In 1916, he bought two farms, called Cologne and
Bombardie, from the Transvaal Consolidated Lands, Ltd. These
properties were located south of Oogles and north of Kinross. At the
time of purchase, these were just ordinary farms with land of not more
than average quality. Mealie crops raised there did not exceed around
eight or nine bags per morgen, average yields at the time.20 Yet by
the mid-1920s, Lazarus had converted the Bombardie and Cologne Estates
into the Transvaal's maize-producing showpieces. "A plant less than
eight or nine feet high was a rarity and many were twelve or thirteen
feet," exclaimed an ecstatic visitor in describing the standing crops
on the Estates. "So immense were the fields that from some points of
view a visitor could have imagined that he was on a planet clothed with
growing maize. Equally as striking as the magnificent uniformity of
the crop was the cleanliness of the soil on which it grew. Weeds have
a very thin time on the Cologne and Bombardie Estates."21
The huge commercial success of his farming operations enabled
Lazarus to boast in 1924 that he was the "largest maize farmer in the
world." By this time, farming operations on the Bombardie and Cologne
Estates alone yielded more than 100,000 bags of mealies from the
estimated 6,000 to 9,000 morgen under cultivation, and produced an
annual harvest of 70,000 to 80,000 bags of potatoes from 400 morgen.
In 1928, for example, the average yield of maize on the Bombardie and
Cologne Estates exceeded 3 0 bags per morgen, and in some parts exceeded
40 to 50 bags.22 This figure was even more astounding when one
compares it with output elsewhere. The average yield for the Bethal
district from the years 1924-1930 was 9.24 bags per morgen. Taking the
'maize triangle' as a whole, the average yield was around 6.35 bags per
morgen during the same period,23 All in all, Lazarus used about 1,200
tons of fertilizer per year and maintained over 2,000 oxen, which were
used for ploughing, transport, and other activities.24
Yet mealies remained the mainstay of his operations. "The best
sort of farming for any settler to start with on the high veld of the
Eastern Transvaal is the mealie," he insisted. "If any young man takes
up the mealie seriously he can learn a very great deal, and at the same
time acquire practical experience which will enable him to go forward
into mixed farming later on."25 Lazarus used between two and three
thousand tons of fertilizers annually on his farms, which included,
besides the Bombardie and Cologne Estates and Langsloot, a number of
smaller farms on the eastern Transvaal highveld and possibly farm
properties in the Orange Free State as well. At the top of the
pyramid, Lazarus hired two white farm managers to oversee his farflung
commercial farming empire. He also employed around 40 white overseers,
foremen, and handymen — "and the number is trebled when their families
are counted". At the bottom of the hierarchy, he employed anywhere
from 600 to 750 Africans for unskilled, manual labour on the farms.26
Lazarus was only one of a sizeable group of parvenu capitalist
farmers who operated in the maize belt of the eastern Transvaal
highveld. By 1920, the Middelburg district was "second to only one
other [district] in the Transvaal as a maize-growing centre."27 Within
the space of a few years, these farmers were employing close to 10,000
"regular workers" in the Bethal/Middelburg area alone.28 Mr. Feldt,
who was a neighbour of Lazarus, "made a fortune in [maize and potato]
farming," and his farming techniques were "an object lesson to anyone,
he having risen from absolute poverty to affluence." In the general
vicinity of Kinross, white farmers like J.J. Dorfan and Company, Stein
and Snipelisky, the Medalie Brothers, the Oppert Brothers, the Pole
Brothers, Breytenbach and Sons, Samuel Gafenowitz, and many others
"made money out of this sort of [staple crop] farming."29
Agrarian entrepreneurs like Esrael Lazarus seemed the very
archetype of the new self-made men who symbolised the great strides
made by progressive farmers in the South African countryside. "The
story of Mr. Lazarus's work is an epic of the soil," one correspondent
exuded with unbridled enthusiasm. "[T]he dynamic energy and sound
common sense of one man in the transformation of the two farms Cologne
and Bombardie" brought about "a monumental conquest of nature."
Lazarus himself embodied the spirit of capitalism as it was understood
in South African ruling class circles. Faced with the growing
impoverishment of xpoor whites' in the countryside, captains of
industry, civic leaders, and state officials alike looked far and wide
for vivid examples of rags-to-riches "success stories" to serve as
inspirations and role models for struggling white farmers. Lazarus was
not adverse to indulging in self-promotion and he actively participated
in cultivating this well-manicured image of himself as a man of humble
origins who exemplified the values of perseverance, diligence, and
thrift. Responding to allegations that staple farming offered a
"doubtful and at best very risky return," Lazarus proclaimed that
"[successful farming] has surely been demonstrated by neighbours and
myself, practically all of whom started with nothing, and to-day own
thousands of acres of profit-earning land due to mealies and other
crops under high production." While he cautioned against "mislead[ing]
farmers and depressing them unduly" about the prospects for successful
farming, he offered praise for "many a hard-working farmer who is doing
his best to develop his own holding as well as to increase the
agricultural prosperity of South Africa."30
Labour Shortages in the Bethal District
During the early decades of the twentieth century, chronic labour
shortages and lack of capital were the two principal barriers blocking
the growth and development of commercial agriculture in the eastern
Transvaal highveld. For farmers, securing reliable labour was always a
constant source of tension and irritation, and they complained bitterly
that available labour consisted of, for example, "the ^kitchen boy'
variety, who, during the term of their service are continually drunk
and loafing, and are therefore never able to adapt themselves to their
work."31 The steady expansion of cash-crop production generated a
demand for labour that far exceeded the capacity of the local resident
work-force. In the ensuing fierce competition for labour, capitalising
farmers quickly absorbed what local supplies were available at the
wages they were willing to pay, driving the market price upwards and
causing considerable ill-feeling amongst those who were left empty-
handed.32 What complicated matters further was that farmers in the
eastern Transvaal maize belt were geographically located at a
considerable distance from concentrated pockets of African settlement.
The entire eastern Transvaal highveld was "practically without
Reserves." With the exception one small Reserve in the Vereeniging
district, there was "nothing else between Ventersdorp to Wakkerstroom
and little elsewhere."33 Capitalising farmers wanted labour, but stood
steadfastly against the creation of a Reserve in the district because
this would permit African owner-occupiers to acquire choice lands in
the settled highveld. As one irate Bethal farmer contended, "it would
be an impossible position to have native farmers in amongst the
Europeans. There is no room for a native area in the district."34
As the commercialising impulse gathered momentum, labour shortages
became more pronounced. Those capitalising farmers who wished to
increase production of staple crops were intent on bringing as much
acreage under cultivation as possible. As a consequence, they were
understandably quite hesitant to accommodate labour-tenants on their
farms because agreements of this sort meant permitting resident African
households to have independent access to prime cultivation and grazing
land.35 Farmers turned to recruiting agencies for assistance, and
these companies, with their well-organised networks already in place,
tapped into the urban slums that sprang up around Johannesburg.
Farmers left no stone unturned in their relentless pursuit of casual
labour, and, in an expedient born of desperation, some resorted to
hiring itinerant drifters wandering through the farming areas.
Until the 1940s, agriculture remained primarily a labour-intensive
activity, and expanded production was primarily achieved through the
simple expedient of enlarging the absolute size of the labour force.
From the outset, the fortunes of the large-scale maize farmers of the
Bethal and Middelburg districts turned on the regular supply of hired
labour. In putting their operations on an efficient and profitable
footing, progressive farmers quickly exhausted local labour supplies.
This relentless quest for alternative channels led desperate farmers to
turn their gaze far afield. In order to secure requisite labour,
farmers formed their own recruiting organisations, and these private
associations were exempted from licencing and other requirements under
the terms of the Native Labour Regulation Act (NLRA) of 1911. In 1912,
Esrael Lazarus and other enterprising Middelburg/Bethal farmers formed
the Farmers' Labour Agency FTransvaalse Landbouwers Arbeids
Maatschappii 1 with the aim of coordinating and streamlining their
recruitment efforts. The Middelburg/Bethal farmers had hoped to
imitate the large-scale Mining Houses with their formalized and highly
successful recruitment practices. Other groups of farmers followed
suit, and soon there were a large number of farmers' recruiting
associations operating in the field.36
From the outset, the Farmers' Labour Agency began to "import
thousands of Kaffirs from Pietersburg — Kaffirs without families.
They are usually picanninies [under-age youngsters]."37 While the 1911
NLRA banned the employment of umfaans (i.e., youngsters under eighteen
years-of-age), these restrictions were waived by administrative fiat
for farmers. Labour relations on the great majority of farms, most of
which still operated through systems of tenancy, were inextricably
intertwined with the widespread use of child labour.38 Nevertheless,
the common abuses associated with recruiting picannins for field work
landed a few farmers in Court, but government officials usually chose
not to interfere. Yet, as these farmers must have intuitively
understood from the outset, the recruitment of child labour provided
only a short-term palliative since these youngsters lacked the physical
strength and durability to provide the type of arduous manual labour
required on the farms. Children were recruited mainly to supplement
the seasonal work of labour tenants already settled on white-owned
farms and to assist adult male Africans dragooned from bushveld farms
in order to "work off their rent."39 In time, the Mining Houses
discovered that their own licenced agents had surreptitiously assisted
the Farmers' Labour Agency in obtaining labour, and, desiring to
eliminate unwanted competition, they were able — through a carefully
orchestrated lobbying campaign — to effectively close it down.40
In 1913, the state administration adopted strict regulations
prohibiting not only the recruitment of so-called "tropical natives"
(i.e., Africans living north of 22 degrees south) but also their
employment on the mines. In large measure, these legal restrictions
came about because of scandalously high death rates on the mines caused
mainly to pneumonia. This ban on the recruitment of "Rhodesian and
East Coast natives" interfered with what had become a prime source of
labour. This combination of the elimination of * tropical' zones as a
fertile labour catchment area for the Chamber of Mines and the rapidly
expanding capitalisation of agriculture contributed to intensified
competition for low-cost black labour and brought mine owners and
large-scale farmers onto a collision course.41 The seemingly
insatiable demands of the Mines for labour created a niche that small-
scale entrepreneurs were quick to fill. Prominent recruiting agencies,
headed by such well-known men as Erskine, Hadley, Kantor, Theron, and
many others, established offices in places like Messina, Pietersburg,
and Louis Trichardt, straddling the jnain labour corridors heading to
Johannesburg and the gold fields. These licenced agencies did their
best to cultivate an image of legitimacy, but they secretly operated in
league with unlicenced * freelancers' who transformed what was called
* illicit trafficking in natives' into a thriving underground
business.42
Chronic labour shortages nurtured a growing desperation on the
part of capitalising farmers in the eastern Transvaal highveld. Under
these circumstances, necessity became the mother of invention. The
steady rise in the demand for farm labour put considerable pressure on
individual farmers to find loop-holes that would allow them to
circumvent the spirit if not the letter of the law.43 It was an open
secret that farmers routinely ignored existing labour statutes. In
order to combat the dramatic increase in recruiting practices of
questionable legality, the state administration heaped new regulations
upon the older more ineffectual ones. Inevitably, the rules governing
labour recruitment became so clouded in ambiguity that state officials
found it virtually impossible to interpret with exactitude what were
authorized procedures and what were not. "Various instructions on the
subject [of the employment of Rhodesian and East Coast Africans] have
from time to time been issued," one perplexed bureaucrat to another,
"with the result that the position has become rather confusing both to
myself and those authorized to employ such natives."44
The large-scale.farmers of the eastern Transvaal highveld took
advantage of the reigning bureaucratic uncertainty to broaden the
geographical scope of their recruitment efforts. During the 1910s,
Lazarus employed labour agents who searched the city slums of
Johannesburg and who reconnoitered the rural areas of the northern
Transvaal in search of work-seeking migrants who had crossed the
Limpopo and were heading for Johannesburg by foot. However, this
approach to securing labour produced only haphazard results, and the
supplies of labour obtained in this manner were inadequate to satisfy
his growing demands. Lazarus, who was consumed by the desire to secure
hired labour for his growing farming operations, seemed undeterred by
bureaucratic obstacles. Imitating the success of the recruiting
agencies that supplied labour for the Mines, he turned his attention
beyond South Africa's borders, and, in 1919, he had wrested at least
unofficial permission from the Director of Native Labour to recruit
Rhodesian labourers.45 Lazarus worked in league with recruiting agents
who transported supplies of food by wagon caravan to sites scattered at
favourite crossing-points along the Limpopo. These agents and their
* native runners' bribed impoverished Rhodesian labourers with food and
cash advances, luring them southward with false promises of hygienic
working conditions and relatively high cash-wages on the white-owned
farms.4*
In mid-1920, the Supreme Court of Natal and the Eastern Division
Supreme Court of the Cape Province overturned existing regulations
restricting labour recruitment and authorized employees of white
farmers to recruit Rhodesian labour.47 Almost immediately, Lazarus
appointed two employees to act as official labour agents in his name.
In actuality, these employees who masqueraded as bona fide labour
agents conveniently masked the operations of "the real recruiters
carrying on a profitable business" of gathering labour.48 Lazarus
depended upon xnative runners' to make initial contacts with Rhodesian
labourers who were brought to Louis Trichardt where they were handed
over to G.E.W. Gould, a labour agent who was employed by both Lazarus
and David Erskine. In turn, Gould fed, clothed, and forwarded the
recruited labourers via the railway to Lazarus at Oogies Station.49
In October 1920, Esrael Lazarus once again appealed to both the
Secretary for Native Affairs, E.R. Garthorne, and the Director of
Native Labour "for any assistance possible to secure further Rhodesian
Natives."50 His persistent requests for special dispensation
eventually bore fruit. The Director of Native Labour instructed the
Sub-Native Commissioner at Louis Trichardt to "recognize the engagement
of Rhodesian Natives by runners working for Mr. Lazarus and extend the
necessary facilities for them to be forwarded to Mr. Lazarus." At the
same time, he emphasized that "we should extend to farmers every
assistance to procure labour," requesting that the Sub-Native
Commissioner "assist as far as possible to inducing natives to accept
farm employment where you are satisfied the conditions are good."51
Virtually overnight, white farmers reaped the rewards of this shift in
labour policy. "Labour Agents in the [Zoutpansberg] District," the
Sub-Native Commissioner at Louis Trichardt conceded, "have become much
interested and active in connection with the collecting and employment
of Rhodesian Natives whom they pass through the runner to the
employer."52 Esrael Lazarus quickly transformed this propitious
opportunity into a profit-making advantage for himself. Not only did
he continue to recruit Rhodesian labourers for the Bombardie and
Cologne Estates but he also expanded his labour recruitment operations
to include supplying labour for white farmers at Empangeni in Natal.53
The labour recruitment euphoria quickly faded. In particular, the
large-scale and highly capitalized farmers clustered around Kinross
were unable to satisfy their own labour demands through far-flung yet
ad hoc recruitment efforts. In 1924, the political alliance between
the Nationalist and Labour Parties swept the ruling South African Party
from office in the general election that signalled a massive shift of
white voters' sympathies toward more formalized segregationist
policies. The Hertzog-Creswell Pact that took office in~June 1924 was
genuinely sympathetic to white farmers but was also strongly committed
to the protection of white wage-earners.54 A steady stream of
influential Eastern Transvaal highveld farmers, including N. Moss, whom
The Farmer's Weekly identified as the "the right-hand man" of Esrael
Lazarus, made the trek to Pretoria to petition and plead with the
newly-installed Cabinet Ministers to overturn the prohibition against
the importation of labourers from above latitude twenty-two degrees
seven minutes.55 Labour-starved farmers were confident that the Pact
regime would concur with their opinion that the restrictions"on labour
recruitment which had been endorsed under the South African Party
regime of Jan C. Smuts did not really apply to farm labour.
However, in September 1924, the new Government notified the civil
administration that the legislative prohibition against the importation
of labour effectively barring white farmers from recruiting labour in
Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa would remain in place. If the
complaints of the large-scale Eastern Transvaal highveld farmers were
justified, then their growing frustration was also predictable. The
so-called up-to-date farmers on the Eastern Transvaal highveld had come
to depend upon imported labour. "Native labour from Rhodesia and
Portuguese Africa is of immense value to us," one farmer complained.
In general, recruited labour contracted for twelve months' service.
These workers were housed in barracks-like accommodations in order to
maximize control and surveillance. Recruiting fees were considerably
less than the prevailing rates expended on obtaining labour within
South Africa's borders. The wages were, as one farmer put it, "exactly
half of that our Union boys get." Equally important, labourers
recruited from Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories submitted more
readily to the discipline and drudgery of farm work. "The boys are raw
and not spoiled by town life," one farmer contended. "[They] are good
workers and not half as brazen-faced as the Basuto or the N'Xosa who
are rather spoon-fed at present."56
Farmers were outraged at the insouciant attitude of the Pact
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regime and this feeling was contagious. "The position now is that our
crops are growing and we have not sufficient labour to deal with them,"
N. Moss exclaimed. "All the farmers are grumbling." A number of
influential men like Lazarus, Hillman, Feldt, and others even went so
far as to threaten a ^production strike' in order to press their class
demands. Moss epitomized this sentiment. "If the Government are [sic]
not prepared to help us we shall be obliged to decrease production," he
angrily declared. "We shall have to give up mealie planting and go in
for sheep and other things. In time, South Africa will be driven to
importing its mealies."57
This bluff appeared to fall on deaf ears. Prime Minister Hertzog
and D.F. Malan, the Minister of the Interior, responded sympathetically
to the rising crescendo of complaints about labour shortages but
steadfastly refused to adopt the course of action favoured by farmers.
Colonel Creswell, the chief Labour Party representative in the Pact
Cabinet, provoked the ire of hard-pressed farmers because of his
insistence that they remedy their labour shortages by hiring white
labour. This suggestion was more than white farmers could bear.
Numerous large-scale Eastern Transvaal farmers had experimented in
earlier years with the employment of white labour and "found it an
utter failure." The kingpin of Eastern Transvaal farming circles,
Esrael Lazarus, had himself employed perhaps more ^poor whites' than
any other large-scale farmer on the Transvaal highveld. Eventually,
however, he abandoned this practice because the *poor whites' were "too
lazy to work." For the most part, the white men who had been employed
"would not and often could not do the work of the kaffir." Other
highly capitalized highveld farmers added their voices to the growing
chorus of complaints about the unreliability and inefficiency of white
labour. "It is no use pretending that South Africa is ever going to be
a white man's country in the sense that white men will take the place
of kaffir labourers on the farms," Moss proclaimed. "It is necessary
for the farmer to have an ample supply of cheap native labour which,
incidentally, for this purpose, was much more efficient [than white
labour] . "58
In early 1925, highly successful highveld farmers like Lazarus,
Frenkel, and others felt obliged to enter the political fray, once
again raising their collective voice in public protest. "The farmers
on the high veld of the Eastern Transvaal," Lazarus contended, "are in
a hopeless position in regard to labour supply." He pinpointed the
^civilised labour policy' of the Pact regime as an ill-conceived
solution to a widely-misunderstood problem. "May I point out to the
Government," Lazarus warned, "that the farmers of South Africa are not
going to have the white labour policy of the Labour Party foisted on
them. Your poor white labour problem is not a cause, it is an effect.
Molly-coddling the native is the cause." Reiterating his principle
objection, he exclaimed: "I am feeling very sore about this matter of
labour, because the future of the agricultural industry seems dark to
me on account of the stupid policy pursued in regard to this matter."59
Others joined the chorus, placing the blame on the privileged position
of the mining industry. ""It seems that the Government does not want
any other industry in the country than mining," H. Frenkel fumed. "The
slightest hint on the part of the 'powers that be' that the mines are
short of labour, and their requirements are speedily attended to."
Despite the fapt that mining and agriculture were inextricably "locked
together for all practical purposes," it seemed that "agriculture has
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got to play second fiddle to the mines."60
The Segmented Labour Market
The nub of the problem of labour shortages was the inability of
hard-pressed white farmers to pay competitive wages. Hemmed in by
indebtedness, low productivity, and lack of credit, farmers looked to
the state administration to assist them in obtaining cheap labour. In
1922, the Director of Native Labour begrudgingly acknowledged that "the
farming industry is considerably handicapped in regard to its native
labour supply" because the "present system of recruiting favour[s] the
mines and wealthier and organized employers."61 Farmers' associations,
particularly the Transvaal Agricultural Union, increasingly articulated
the common grievances of agrarian capital, complaining bitterly about
the preferential treatment that the Mines enjoyed with respect to
labour recruitment and demanding state intervention to tip the scales
in the other direction.62 In the late 1920s, farmers who had applied
to the Director of Native Labour to obtain Rhodesian labour at Louis
Trichardt were placed on a "waiting list" and were left cooling their
heels for more than a year.63
White farmers accused the Chamber of Mines of monopolizing the
most valuable labourers and leaving the ^rejects' — who were regarded
as unsuitable for hard work — to be picked over by labour-starved
farmers.64 The Director of Native Labour admitted that "there is a
considerable supply of natives, consisting of youths, men of middle age
and adults who are for various reasons not fitted for mine work, that
could be made available for farmers at small cost." "At present," he
continued, "such natives are either recruited by labour agents, who lay
themselves out to secure farm labour, and are sent to individual
farmers at a cost of about L3, plus railage and advances, to the
farmer, or find their own way to the larger industrial centres." If
these Africans who congregated in the urban slums did not "find work on
their own account," they were eventually "picked up by one of the
labour [recruiting] organizations and drafted to small employers."65
One agricultural expert argued that "it is an old, festering scandal"
that labour recruitment for the white farms "is handled by private
^enterprise' for private profit." Recruiting agencies concentrated
their efforts on supplying the mines, "with a fitful by-pass to the
farmer of boys too old, too young, or too unfit for mine work; under no
control, with no visible system, and on fees which are simply a blood-
tax screwed out of the farmer's dire necessity."66 One Bethal farmer
admitted that "to get labour one has to use unscrupulous methods."
Others complained that farmers' recruiting organisations were "nothing
but a racket."67
White farmers, with the exception of the Natal sugar growers,
failed to satisfactorily address their labour supply problems "for the
simple reason that it is impossible for fifty or a hundred farmers in
any district to organise themselves into an association and
successfully carry out a labour scheme."68 The Randlords learned
through their own bitter experience the folly of maintaining their own
separate labour recruiting organizations. Intense competition resulted
in the dramatic upturn in the cost of obtaining labour. "But the
attempt," a prominent licenced recruiter contended, "to bring a farmer
from Malmesbury growing wheat, another from Zululand growing sugar,
another engaged in wattle plantation or growing mealies in the high
veldt of the Eastern Transvaal, or cattle or sheep farmers in the Free
State and other farmers together, and imagine you will get them to see
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eye-to-eye precisely what should be done for the benefit of all of them
in regard to [labour recruitment], I feel . . . is hopeless."69
Comparatively speaking, while it was quite an "easy matter for five or
six heads of the mining industry, all living in Johannesburg, to meet
and establish an organization to supply the mines with labour, it is an
entirely different matter for thousands of farmers spread out all over
the Transvaal and Free State, with the varying conditions and
circumstances under which they are farming, to form such an
organization. "70
As a general rule, white farmers remained fiercely
individualistic. Local farmers' associations often experienced
considerable difficulty in encouraging cooperation amongst their
members and imposing at least a modicum of discipline. In the Bethal
district, at least three separate labour recruiting organisations
supplied local farmers with labour during the 1930s and 1940s. Some
farmers complained that the largest recruiting agency, the Boere
Arbeidsvereeniging. was "run by a small clique for their own benefit
more or less on a political basis."71 Nevertheless, there were a few
success stories. In the early 1920s, the Lydenberg-North District
Farmers Association, for example, went to great lengths to "place their
native farm labour on a less slipshod basis." The farmers divided
"their areas into little circles of perhaps a half a dozen farms, the
number of farms in each circle being greater or less according to local
conditions." The Association appointed a leading farmer in each circle
was "to look after their common interests," including the all-important
question of farm labour. This leading farmer "must see that native
trekking to farms do not all go to one man but are gradually more
evenly distributed within his circle."72
Ad hoc solutions of this sort more or less satisfied local needs
but did little or nothing to address the overall problem of chronic
labour shortages on the white-owned farms. Some prominent individuals
complained that "small private enterprises here and there" were
woefully inadequate to deal with the problem of farm labour shortages
"to the best interests of the Country." They suggested instead that an
adjunct branch of the Department of Agriculture be created to
coordinate labour recruitment. "In other words," it was boldly stated,
"you have to organize for [the farmers]."73 To say the least,
government bureaucrats were very reluctant to assume this additional
burden. The Director of Native Labour expressed the common sentiments
of high-ranking state officials when he declared: "There are many
difficulties in the way of Government undertaking the allocation of
labourers to farmers who are not known individually to natives, and
some guarantee would have to be provided that natives were treated in
terms of their contract."74 During the 1920s, farmers in the Bethal,
Middelburg, and Ermelo districts began to tap the prisons in order to
secure much-needed labour. This practice was not particularly novel.
Farmers in various regions of South Africa had in certain instances
been able to acquire labour from the prisons. But what distinguished
the mid-1920s Bethal/Ermelo experiment was its extent and scope. When
the Prisons Department had agreed to supply Bethal farmers with large
batches of prison labour, they had housed "the natives in the same
compounds, and under the same conditions," as those used for
accommodating ordinary contract labourers.75
The Despotic Labour Regime on the Bethal Farms
The steady expansion of commercial agriculture in the Bethal
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district was accompanied by a substantial increase in the size of the
permanent African population. From 1921 to 194 6, the number of
Africans in the district increased from 18,000 to 39,000. This
population increase was largely the result of the influx of extra-Union
Africans from Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland who had initially came to
work on the farms but lingered on at the expiry of their contracts,
filling up niches in the local casualised labour market. By the 1940s
if not before, approximately 110 farmers on large-scale landed estates
in the heartland of the eastern Transvaal maize belt employed * foreign'
labourers who migrated principally from Nyasaland and Southern
Rhodesia, but also from Bechuanaland, Northern Rhodesia, and Portuguese
East Africa, and who were housed in closed compounds.76
The first step toward incorporating African work-seekers into the
alien world of the large estates began well before they set foot in the
maize belt. The great majority of migrants who came to the white-owned
farms worked under six- or twelve-month contracts. The labour contract
was secured when recruits, whether singly or in large batches, appeared
before a magistrate, or other state-approved "attesting officer," who
verified that they had agreed to work and understood the terms of
employment. The standard farm labour contract was a legally binding
agreement obliging Africans to work for a designated period under the
supervision of a particular farmer. The stylised ritual of coming
before an inquiring government official masked a highly unequal
relationship where African recruits often understood very little about
the procedures that were conducted in their name. The system of labour
contracting was fraught with such ambiguity that it openly invited
fraud and deception. In preparing an expose on the Bethal farms for
Drum magazine, a journalist reported that the method of recruiting
casual labour off the streets of Johannesburg amounted to nothing more
than groups of fifty Africans parading past an "attesting officer" and
touching a pencil held above the contract sheet. By piecing together
fragments scattered throughout the archival records and elsewhere, it
is possible to arrive at the conclusion that Africans had little
influence over where they contracted for work and were frequently
surprised when they found themselves on white-owned farms when they
expected to be somewhere else.77
The labour contract imposed a new social identity on African
recruits. In the course of temporarily binding them to a fixed term of
employment under particular conditions, the contract established these
recruits as legal entities subject to penal sanctions, including
imprisonment and deportation. On their part, farmers welcomed the
stiff penalties for breach of contract and frequently called on state
assistance in tracking down deserters who fled their farms in the dead
of night.78 The relations of power on the large estates were played
out in the interstices of the built environment. The big farms were
carefully divided into two sociocultural worlds that reflected the
great chasm dividing master from servant, European from xnative', and
propertied from propertyless. As a general rule, the most prominent
feature — both architecturally and visually — of the large landed
estate was the complex of well-constructed buildings comprising the
living quarters for the family of the owner or manager. The grandeur,
spaciousness, and cleanliness of the homestead symbolised the class
power of the landed elite.79 In contrast, the drab, unsightly living
quarters for workers were more often than not situated away from the
center of the estate and hidden from view.
14
Large-scale farmers modelled their estates after the Rand mines,
and, as a consequence, were compulsive about encasing their labourers
within an all-encompassing sociocultural environment. Almost without
exception, workers on the large estates were housed in barracks-like
accommodations. The quality of these living quarters varied
considerably. On occasion, estate owners provided properly ventilated,
well-constructed brick structures with cement floors and bunks on the
inside. Some compounds were "in an orderly and clean state," where
latrines and places for washing and bathing were provided." But these
conditions were the exception and not the rule. Most compounds were in
such a dilapidated state that they were "unsuitable for the occupation
of natives" or were "places into which no decent employer would house
his animals."80
Frightening stories about ill-treatment on the Bethal farms,
repeated with monotonous regularity, eventually gained the attention of
state officials, particularly those connected with the Health
Department, the Government Native Labour Bureau, and the Native Affairs
Department. In response, various state bureaucracies sometimes
authorised first-hand inspections of farm compounds, and, fortunately,
scattered and fragmentary selections of these reports have been
preserved in the archival record. For example, the observations of the
Bethal magistrate after inspecting the farm compound of Jacob Hyman
offers a rare glimpse into the deplorable living conditions on the
white-owned farms:
There were no lavatories or conveniences and human faeces were
lying everywhere around in the immediate vicinity of the
compounds. The compound was completely enclosed by a high wall in
places protected by broken bottles and glass. The outer door was
locked from the inside. There were two rooms inside, one of which
was also under lock and key from the outside. These two rooms
were occupied by a large number of natives whose only bedding
consisted of sacks. Should any inmate wish to go to the arrear he
had to knock on the door until the so-called policeboy or bossboy
would open it and escort him outside the compound for fear he
should run away.81
Government inspectors routinely reported that compounds were surrounded
by high walls or "enclosed with barbed wire nine feet high." Windows
or openings in the walls were almost always covered with iron bars.
Many compounds were watched by armed sentries who were on duty night
and day, and gates were locked from the outside every evening to
prevent the inmates from deserting.82 The "natives," who sometimes
slept on dirt floors with only straw mats to shield them against the
cold winter nights, "have to relieve themselves in the mealie fields
nearby," or through small holes in the compound walls, because of the
absence of toilet facilities. As a general rule, the compounds did not
provide proper lighting and ventilation. . Most were "verminous, with
flies in myriads, and some are indescribably filthy." Overcrowding was
commonplace, and farmers frequently resorted to placing the spillover
from the compounds in sheds and backyard hovels dispersed around their
farms. Beginning in the mid-1940s, a number of estate owners
constructed formidable brick and cement buildings to house their
workers. While these new facilities showed marked improvement over
older, dilapidated wooden structures, they were, in the words of the
Secretary for Health, "nothing else but formidable prisons."83
One of the most striking features about large estates of the
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eastern Transvaal maize belt was the rigid regimentation of the working
day. The logic of the system of labour relations corresponded to what
Eugene Genovese described in another context as one which "pushed the
masters to break their slaves' spirit and to reconstruct it as an
unthinking and unfeeling extension of their own will."84 Farm work was
backbreaking, manual labour which required an "incessant [expenditure
of effort] in the lands from ^sunrise to sunset'."85 To put it more
precisely, depending upon the time of the year, workers generally
toiled in the fields from 5:00 a.m. till after 7:00 p.m. In contrast
with agricultural production on the small farms, white farmers on the
Bethal estates made use of nascent Taylorist modes of labour
organisation to eliminate natural pores in the working-day and
accelerate the pace of work. The labour process was structured along
quasi-military lines, and the harsh regime of discipline and
surveillance prevailing on the estates was extended into the fields.
In order to coordinate their activities and concentrate their efforts,
workers were organised into gangs. Tasks were fragmented and
simplified. In order to prevent loafing, supervisors assigned specific
tasks to individuals or work-teams to be completed during the course of
the working day. The young, the old, and even the sick were expected
to keep pace with the more robust workers. If anyone failed to
complete their piece-work quota, foremen refused to mark their ticket.
Lazarus, for example, recognized that "part of the secret" of operating
large-scale farming enterprises revolved around the efficient and
judicious use of labour-time. "If a kaffir would remain in employment
on the Lazarus Estates," he contended, "he must work to time; he must
promptly and smartly obey orders and execute tasks. All his working
hours belong to the employer, who pays him a money-wage and supplies
him with his needs."86
Work activities consisted of little more than simple cooperation
where labourers relied primarily upon hand-held instruments of
production to complete their daily tasks. Without the widespread use
of mechanically-driven farm equipment, farmers depended upon harnessing
draught animals for the heavy work of plowing, harrowing, and haulage.
The flip-side of this type of work regime that depended principally
upon sweated labour and primitive tools was the extensive use of force
and violence to compel Africans to expend greater physical effort.
"Native foremen, and frequently white overseers on horseback," followed
behind the gangs of field hands, "invariably with whips or some
instrument in their hands" to spur the workers to move quickly.
"Throughout the hours that the labourers are at work," one inspector
reported, "they have to work hard and continuously and are naturally
continually being urged on."87
Workers were paid by on the xticket system' where the completion
of 30 separate shifts was equivalent to a month of contracted labour
service. Supervisors rarely marked work-books at the end of each day,
but at the week-end. Labourers were not paid for Sundays and days not
worked. Because proper records were practically non-existent, workers
were subjected to widespread abuse of trust and were cheated at every
opportunity. Labourers frequently complained that their tickets were
not marked when work was stopped on account of rain. They also
protested bitterly that "if anyone talked in the lands while working,
or became ill and could not carry on, or lagged behind when working or
proceeding to work, he was sent back to the compound, got no food
during the day and his ticket for that day was not marked."88
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Wage rates on the Bethal estates naturally fluctuated over time
and by category of worker. By the mid-1930s, wages for contract
workers ranged from 15/- for youths to 30/- for adults per 30 shifts
worked, along with food and quarters. On the big farms, there were a
number of long-service employees who occupied intermediate posts such
as baas-bovs, foremen, and oxen drivers. These labourers had special
privileges such as living in their own separate quarters, were
frequently married, and received wages that sometimes reached L2.10 per
month. The large estates also employed full-time cooks. Food
preparation was generally carried out in a primitive way — that is, in
three-legged pots in the open over "mealie stronk" fires. In some
places, there were open sheds "where flies and other filth abound." At
Bombardie, Cologne, and Longsloot Estates, there were brick fireplaces
with large built-in pots, under cover of a roof in corrugated iron
sheds with open sides. Yet in all these places, "flies are much in
evidence and little effort seems to be made to keep them down." At
Cologne and Bombardie, the compounds had water spigots; but at
Longsloot, labourers fetched water in large drums at considerable
distance from living quarters. In other places, water was obtained
from the usual farm supply and washing facilities were located at dams
and spruits. Farm labourers, and especially the so-called ^tropicals',
were particularly susceptible to respiratory diseases. Gross
overcrowding in the compounds facilitated the rapid spread of
contagious diseases, and poor or nonexistent sanitation ensured that
exposure to infection was ubiquitous.89
Compound managers made every effort to gain compensatory savings
on standard expenses — and in particular non-wage costs such as
rations, housing accommodations, and medical care. Farmers formally
agreed to provide rations, including separated milk, vegetables, and
meat, over the duration of the labour contract. Workers, however,
rarely if ever received what they were promised. The principal article
of food was mealie meal — served thrice daily at breakfast, midday and
evening. Labourers complained that during the day they generally
received only mealie meal, frequently insufficiently and badly cooked,
and that milk was provided only at the evening meal. Workers ate their
breakfast and midday meals in the fields. On the larger farms, the
food was taken to them at lunch time in drums by scotch cart, and in
the smaller places by wheelbarrow. "Some natives have little billy
cans into which their porridge is placed," Brink explained. In most
cases, however, "they are simply given the food in their hands which,
of course, they have no opportunities of washing." Some farmers made a
regular habit of selling the meat of animals which died, and dead
fowls, to their labourers. In accordance with common practice, the
price of the meat purchased was marked on the back of the ticket and
deducted from wages due. Once absorbed into the labour regime on the
estates, it became extremely difficult for farm labourers to break
loose of the tightening bonds. After accepting advances ranging from
LI to L4, the ordinary recruit arrived on the farm already in debt.
Recruits were expected to compensate their employers for the costs, of
rail or lorry transport to the farm. Each recruit was expected to
"repay these [debts] before he receives a penny for his labours." It
was thus not unusual for farm workers to toil in the fields for three
months before acquiring any cash payments, by which time they were
usually in debt at the company store which most farmers kept on the
properties. Farmers automatically deducted the costs of items
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purchased at the company store from wages due. Hence, almost all
workers had virtually nothing to show for their labours by the time
they completed their contracts.90
At the expiry of their contracts, recruits found it very difficult
to serve notice and leave the farms. Farmers quite cleverly resorted
to all sorts of tricks to hold their workers in semi-bondage and extend
their contracts of service. Generally speaking, farmers withheld wage
payments to their labourers for at least a month after they were due.
By holding wages in arrears, farmers were applying a tourniquet to stop
the labour hemorrhaging brought about by widespread desertions. Yet
accumulated earnings were almost always relatively meagre, and, in the
case of workers desperate to escape the deplorable living and working
conditions, their loss was hardly a sufficient deterrent. By the
1940s, Bethal farmers had to recruit upwards to 30,000 migrant workers
annually in order to meet their actual requirements of between 14,000
and 18,000 workers. Desertion rates varied from farm to farm and year
to year. But, on balance, perhaps as many as 2 0 percent of the migrant
labourers fled the farms in violation of their contracts.91
The Ambiguities of Conflict and Accommodation
Uprooting Africans from their disparate rural communities and
throwing them together on the Bethal estates did not transform these
wage-labourers into a homogeneous mass of proletarians where their
shared experience as exploited workers overshadowed and dissolved their
previously-held sociocultural bonds. Rather than erasing past social
ties, the harsh realities of living and working on the Bethal farms
appeared to reinforce, paradoxically as that might seem, old loyalties
and to create new ones. Africans from Rhodesia usually arrived in the
Transvaal in "bands of from ten upwards in number11 were reluctant to
split up into sub-groups of twos and threes, and preferred instead to
contract en masse for employment on white-owned farms. Once on the
farms, labourers tended to cluster into social groups that were largely
ethnic in origin and composition.92 These minute networks of "cultural
reticulation," as Pino Arlacchi puts it, "broke the solidarity" founded
on purely economic criteria, thereby undermining strictly class
mobilisation on the estates.93
The main fault lines dividing the supervisory staff on the large-
scale estates were racial in nature, but even here there were
gradations in authority, income, and outlook. At the top, white farm-,
managers supervised the whole production process on the large estates.
They occupied, to use Erik Olin Wright's concept, "contradictory class
locations."94 On the one side, successful farm managers often used
their experience and savings to vault into landownership, the "the poor
man's chance" it was called. On the other side, supervisory jobs
symbolised the downward mobility of *poor whites' pushed off the
land.95
Researchers who have studied agrarian relations in South Africa
have frequently wondered at the overt quiescence of farm workers in the
face of grinding poverty and daily harassment. At face value, it might
seem puzzling that farm workers only rarely went on strike or revolted.
Grievances accumulated and festered, occasionally spilling over into
protest meetings, surging crowds, and rioting. These were the
exceptions and not the rule.96 It should be obvious that collective
protest of whatever sort invariably invited severe retaliation and
repression, and the agrarian underclass seldom had the political or
social organisation or material resources at their disposal to make
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direct confrontation a useful and winning strategy. Under
circumstances where management absolutism reigned supreme, farm
labourers who served out the terms of their contracts had little
alternative but to resign themselves, ostensibly at least, to the iron
discipline of their overseers. Yet even if workers did indeed perceive
themselves to be virtually enslaved on the farms, there is plenty of
evidence, both circumstantial and otherwise, which suggests that they
did not simply act as apathetic, passive victims. Farm labourers
certainly developed acute feelings of injustice about their peculiar
situation. But without strikes and independent organisation, it is
only possible to know the ways that they struggled to soften the burden
of work by ^reading the signs' of largely hidden, silent, and
individualised acts of resistance to management absolutism. Workers
tended to fall back on their own devices, and footdragging, sabotage,
and theft, along with other forms of defiance, which James Scott has so
admirably described in another context, were commonplace.97 It must be
stressed that although these actions were largely spontaneous they were
certainly not random. Individualised acts, repeated again and again,
forged recognizable patterns of resistance which kept estate management
off balance. In the context of persistent labour shortages, desertion
was perhaps the most damaging act of resistance. Why contract workers
wanted to flee was not difficult to understand. Recruiting practices
involving force and deceit often backfired. "It is no use persuading
the Natives to go to the farms when they don't want to," one
exasperated farmer exclaimed. "Unwilling labour is useless." Those
Africans who were tricked into agreeing to long-term contracts or who
had been forced against their will to go and work on the farms often
took the first opportunity to run away.98
Violence and Social Death
Orlando Patterson suggests that the condition of slavery involved
two contradictory principles, namely, marginality and integration.
Slavery, he contends, historically entailed "institutionalised
marginality," where slaves were socially nonpersons who existed in a
"liminal state of social death."99 For Patterson, these conditions
were the defining characteristics of slavery. In many ways, what
Patterson has to say about slavery bears a striking resemblance to the
miserable treatment and brutal exploitation of * foreign' recruits on
the large estates of the eastern Transvaal maize belt. In this sense,
his understanding of the sociohistorical significance of enslavement
can assist us in coming to grips with the special place that the Bethal
farms occupy in the inglorious history of agrarian evolution and
development in the South African countryside. Estate workers set foot
in the eastern Transvaal highveld as semi-permanent resident aliens.
From the point of view of employers and state officials, their most
important possession was their labouring capacity, and once this
capacity was expended or lost they were subject to expulsion. As
outsiders with few legal rights and no social standing, contract
workers existed in limbo, or at least something akin to a state of
suspended animation. In both the press and official government
circles, reports surfaced time and again about how unsuspecting
Africans had "disappeared," seemingly without a trace, from the streets
of Johannesburg, from prison, or elsewhere, only later to be found on
the Bethal farms, claiming to have been ^press-ganged', or dragooned,
into service against their will.100 Labourers spoke in hushed tones
about fellow-workers who had been beaten to death in the fields or who
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perished in the compounds due to unknown maladies, only to be buried
without benefit of a medical post-mortem in unmarked graves on the
Bethal farms.101
The rituals of rulership on the Bethal estates were intimately
connected with efforts of farmers to assert control over the bodies of
their workers. Careful investigation and analysis of the ways in which
estate managers physically brutalised their workers can bring a
heightened awareness of the molecular underpinnings of agrarian
capitalism — or what Michel Foucault has called the "microphysics of
power," Physical force, administered with callous disregard for the
well-being of those who were victimised, contributed to the
disciplining of habits and breaking the spirit of strong-willed
workers. xCheeky natives' were imprisoned and chained. The 'lazy' and
shiftless' were routinely denied food rations. Assaults, floggings,
and beatings took place with monotonous regularity.102 The domination
that estate owners exercised over the bodies of their workers
symbolised their absolute power over life and death. To be more
specific, the act of physical disfigurement and ritualised scarring —
the stigmata of the oppressed — were outward signs of * symbolic
death'. One shocked labour inspector intuitively understood the power
of brute force on the white-owned farms:
What struck me particularly on some farms was the cowed
appearance of the labourers and their demeanor when
questioned as to complaints. It was obvious that they were
afraid to voice any complaints and it was only after I
i resorted to the method of examining their bodies that I
discovered two cases of gross ill-treatment. In the one case
I found a gang of aboiyt 60 labourers, 75 percent of whom bore
old and fresh marks of beatings — there were fresh weals and
old scars all over their bodies, a sight really pitiful to
see. According to the natives the beatings had been
administered by a native foreman.103
The sheer randomness and capriciousness of corporal punishment spread
fear amongst the workers. This calculated application of physical
violence rendered coercion possible. For frightened workers, the
experience of physical abuse engendered a sense of powerlessness,
stimulating acquiescence to authority and compliance with order.
The exercise of excessive force and violence on the estates was
directly linked to the desire on the part of owners to impose new work
habits and a new time discipline on raw recruits, particularly umfaans
and so-called ^blanket kaffirs', who were more accustomed to the
irregular labour rhythms of subsistence agriculture. In the fields, it
was a common practice for both white and African overseers "to use
their whips when they consider the occasion warrants it." Workers were
routinely treated as unthinking beasts of burden. "We are inspanned
like oxen," wrote a group of seven Africans from Northern Rhodesia who
also complained of excessive fatigue and one meal of rationed porridge
per day, "[our] necks are swollen on account of the yokes we are
inspinned [sic] to."lw This imagery of equating the treatment of
workers with that of animals appears frequently in the archival
records. "We are flogged for.no reason as cattle," one African
proclaimed. Others complained that "their sleeping accommodation is
not fit for pigs."105
The large-scale farmers who specialised in cash-crop production
were forced to operate in a fiercely competitive market for migrant
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labourers. Wretched living conditions, appalling physical abuse, and
exacting penal sanctions were not aberrations, a reflection of the
moral callousness and cruelty of a handful of white farmers and their
overly enthusiastic managers and foremen. Instead, these were an
integral part of the estate order, central elements in the historical
process through which a large, amorphous, and revolving mass of
* foreign' labourers were compelled to work against their will on
isolated farms in the eastern Transvaal highveld. The profits of the
estate owners depended upon squeezing labour-time out of reluctant
workers, and it was toward this ultimate end that the savagely harsh
labour regime was directed.
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